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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Here, the court in deciding in favor of lessor liability cited as authority a
case which had entirely different facts and created a completely separate problem. Query, what effect will the instant case have on future litigation? It appears that the New Jersey court has misapplied the negligence doctrine in
this instance in applying it to a prepared script case when its rationale is limited
to "ad libbing" situations. It would seem that the distinction is a valid one
and that it should be maintained.
TORTS--NEGLIGENCE-LAST CLEAR CHANCE-EFFECT OF
CONTINUING NEGLIGENCE
Administratrix brought an action under a wrongful death statute for
damages resulting from the negligent killing of deceased. Deceised had parked
his truck so that it protruded upon a highway in violation of a state statute.
While he was under the truck, it was negligently hit by defendant, killing deceased. Held, that the contributory negligence of deceased bars the action
of his administratrix. Haase v. Willers Truck Service, 34 N.W.2d 313
(S.D. 1948).
The court commented that if the plaintiff had asserted that the defendant
had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, and was therefore liable, the
plaintiff still could not have recovered because of the deceased's continuing
negligence. The dissent maintained that the deceased's continuing negligence
would not have prevented the assertion of the last clear chance doctrine by the
plaintiff because such continuing negligence was of a passive nature.
Where a defendant seeks to avoid liability for his negligent injury to the
plaintiff by proving contributory negligence, the plaintiff usually asserts that
the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the injury and is, therefore,
liable under the last clear chance doctrine. Where the defendant actually sees
the perilous situation in which the plaintiff has involved himself by his contributory negligence in time to avoid the injury, it is generally held that the
defendant has the last clear chance to avoid the accident even though the
plaintiff is physically able to extricate himself from the perilous situation but,
through his own inattentiveness, fails to do so.' In those situations where
the defendant did not actually discover the peril of the plantiff but, by the
use of reasonable care, ought to have discovered such peril, it is generally
agreed that the defendant will be held to have had the last clear chance to
avoid the injury if the plaintiff was physically unable to extricate himself
from the perilous situation.3
If, however, the plaintiff was physically able to extricate himself from
the situation of peril which he created by his own contributory negligence,
1. Merchant's Transport Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 149 So. 401 (1933) ; See Note,

92 A.LR. 83, 86 (1934).

.2. Merchant's Transport Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 149 So. 401 (1933); Dunn Bus
Service v. McKinley; 130:Fla. 778, 178 So. 865 (1937).
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there is conflict as to whether the defendant will be held liable under the last
clear chance doctrine if he did not actually discover the perilous situation but,
by the use of reasonable care, ought to have discovered such situation in time
to have avoided the injury by the use of reasonable care.8 Those jurisdictions
which do permit application of the last clear chance doctrine u'nder the above
hypothesis and, consequently, permit recovery by the plaintiff, will not, however, permit such recovery if the plaintiff's failure to exercise his physical
ability to extricate himself was due to his negligent failure to discover the
peril which he created by his contributory negligence;4 such negligent failure
is termed continuing negligence.
As previously stated, the court commented that if the plaintiff had relied
upon the last clear chance doctrine, his failure to discover his own peril after
his contributory negligence had resulted in a dangerous situation from which
he would have been physically able to extricate himself had he not been inattentive would have barred his recovery. This is in accord with the view
just stated as to the effect of such continuing negligence. 5 But the dissent relies upon a view which seems peculiar to Connecticut in holding that continuing negligence will not bar recovery under the last clear chance doctrine
if it is of a positive nature.6 This view regards continuing negligence as passive if the plaintiff, after creating the dangerous situation
through his own contributory negligence, subsequently does nothing further
to change or aggravate that situation.7 Continuing negligence will he regarded
as active and bar recovery under the last clear chance doctrine even in Connecticut where the plaintiff, after creating a situation of peril through contributory negligence, subsequently acts in a negligent manner which subsequent negligence differs in character or quality front the original contributory
negligence."
It is submitted that the Connecticut view is based on a misconception as
to the correct meaning of continuing negligence. It is apparent that such continuing negligence as the Connecticut courts regard as passive,9 to permit recovery by the plaintiff under the last clear chance doctrine, is identical with
that continuing negligence which most other jurisdictions regard as sufficient
to deny recovery to the plaintiff, that is, a failure to take steps to discover a
peril of one's own making. The Connecticut courts are apparently disregarding the actual doctrine of continuing negligence and permitting recovery
3. Kansas City S.R. Co. v. Ellzey, 275' U.' S. 236 (1927), exemplifies weight of
authority which denies recovery under the last clear chance doctrine under the stated fact
situation. In support of permitting recovery in this fact situation, see Tutweiler v. Lowery,

279 Fed. 479 (1922).
4. See Note, 92 A.L.R. 140 (1934).
5. Ibid.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Nehring v. Connecticut Company, 86 Conn. 109, 84 Atl. 301 (1912).
Correnti v. Catino 115 Conn. 213, 160 Ati. 892 (1932).
Ibid.
See note 6 supra.
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despite it. That which Connecticut regards as active continuing negligence to
(active negligent acts subsequent to the contributory negligence which caused
the perilous situation) seems to be in reality but a continuation of that original
contributory negligence rather than what is meant by continuing negligence.
TORTS-NUISANCE-CASTING OF LIGHT ON ADJOINING LAND
AS NUISANCE
Plaintiff, operator of a drive-in, outdoor, motion picture theater, brought
a suit in trespass 1 and nuisance against a race track operator, alleging that
the light cast from defendant's race track invaded his property and interfered
with the reasonable use of his land in its natural condition, i.e., darkness. Defendant claimed that a reasonable use of his land caused injury to the plaintiff
only because of the delicate use to which the plaintiff had put his land. The
defendant had a directed verdict in the trial court. Held, on appeal, judgment
affirmed. Since plaintiff's use of'his land was of a peculiarly delicate and sensitive nature, there was neither trespass nor nuisance. Amphitheaters, Inc. v.
Portland Meadows, 198 P.2d 847 (Ore. 1948).
There are few cases discussing this type of interference when it results
from a clash of commercial interests. 2 Most of the precedents involve the con3
flict between a commercial interest and the enjoyment of residential property.
In the instant case, the court drew a distinction on the basis of whether
the property was being put to a residential or a commercial use. 4 The real
distinction, it would seem, should be the effect on the user. Assuming that
the adjoining landowner is making a reasonable use of his land, a residential
user "highly susceptible" to smoke,5 sounds 1 or similar interference is analogous to commercial user engaged in a particular enterprise which may demand
10. Ibid.
1. 39 Am. Jur. 282: "Thus, where there is no actual physical invasion of the
plaintiff's property, the cause of action is for nuisance rather than trespass."
2. The Shelburne, Inc. v. Crossan, 95 N.J. Eq. 188, 122 AtI. 749 (1923); Wallace &
Tiernan, Inc. v. United States Cutlery Co., 97 N.J. Eq. 408, 128 Atl. 872 (1925) Bradbury
Marble Co. v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 128 Mo. App. 96, 106 S.W. 594 (1907); Noyes v.
Huron & Erie Mtg. Corp., [1932] Ont. L. R. 426, 3 D.L.R. 143; Kine v. Jolly, 1 Ch. D.
480 (1905) ;Eastern & South African Telegraph Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Companies,
L.R., A.C. 381, 36 Digest 188, 313 (1902) ; Robinson v. Kilvert, 41 Ch. D. 88 (1889).
3. Kellogg v. Mertens, 30 So.2d 777 (La. App. 1947) ; Nugent v. Melville Shoe Corp.,
980 Mass. 469, 182 N.E. 825 (1932), noted 7 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 192 (1933); Shepler
v. Kansas Milling Co., 128 Kau. 554, 278 Pac. 757 (1929). The usual situation is that of
a property owner versus night spectator sports, Board of Education of Louisville v.
Klein, 303 Ky. 234, 197 S.W.2d 427 (1946); Hansen v. Independent School Dist. No. I,
61 Idaho 109, 98 P.2d 959 (1939) ; Casteel v. Town of Afton, 277 Iowa 61, 287 N.W.
245 (1939); Warren Co. v. Dickson, 185 Ga. 481, 195 S.E. 568 (1938) ; Russell v.
Nostrand Athletic Club, 212 App. Div. 543. 209 N.Y. Supp. 76 (1925). Or again, the
disturbance of sleep resulting from lights shining into sixty hotel rooms from a sign, The
Shelburne, Inc. v. Crossan, Corp., supra.
4. Cases cited note 3 sutra; in each case cited the court based its decision on the
effect of a reasonable use of the property to persons of ordinary sensibilities.
5. Bradbury Marble Co. v. Laclede Gas Light Co., snpra.
6. Russell v. Nostrand Athletic Club, supra.

